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1. Introduction
Collateralization plays a crucial role in financial markets, but policy recommendations con-
cerning the use of collateral are contradictory. The World Development Report 2002 em-
phasizes how important collateral is for the provision of loans. Therefore, the policy rec-
ommendation for less developed countries is to secure property rights in order to establish
potential collateral (World Bank, 2001). Nevertheless, there are arguments against collat-
eralization (Jackson, 1986). In a theoretical model, Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001)
show that competing banks demand collateral inefficiently often and thereby reduce the in-
formation generated by the banks. They conclude that the banks’ capability to demand
collateral should be restricted in the case of bank competition. Their model is based on the
assumption that banks can generate better information about the success probability of a
project than the entrepreneur, which happens, for instance, if firms are overconfident. The
evidence whether firms are indeed overconfident is equivocal (for a discussion of the related
empirical literature see Wu and Knott (2006)).1 Thus, so far, the theoretical literature does
not provide full answers to the question of how desirable collateralization is.
Most likely, banks have superior screening skills in certain segments of the banking market
in countries with a “well developed” banking sector. In many countries, banking markets
are less sophisticated and, in particular, bank staff is only beginning to gain experience in
evaluating credit risk. Thus, banks cannot generate more information about the chances of
success than the entrepreneurs. In this paper, we focus on such a situation where banks are
not better able to evaluate a project’s risk than entrepreneurs. We analyze the incentive
of banks to collateralize a loan or to screen the applicant in order to overcome asymmetric
1Banking with overly optimistic entrepreneurs is modeled in Manove and Padilla (1999).
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information on the project’s type. In particular, we study how this incentive depends on the
specific characteristics of a banking market and the degree of bank competition.
Our model captures different levels of market development. We achieve this by incor-
porating varying costs of screening and collateral. Collateralization is costly because a
deadweight loss arises if the collateralized assets are liquidated. Thus, the better the le-
gal environment (and consequently, the lower the cost of liquidation) and the more liquid
the market where the asset is sold, the lower is the deadweight loss. However, through
offering collateral a firm reveals its true type. The costs of screening consist of the vari-
able costs of evaluating credit proposals and the expected loss of financing non-creditworthy
firms, because the screening technology provides only an imperfect signal on the applicant’s
creditworthiness. The more experienced the bank, the more precise is the signal. Both a
monopolistic bank and competing banks trade off the costs of collateralization relative to
that of screening.
From our theoretical analysis, we derive three main results. First, the decision of the
monopolistic bank to offer a collateralized contract is, in contrast to the case of competing
banks, not distorted. Second, we show that competing banks collateralize credit contracts
less often than a monopolistic bank. In the case of two banks, each competing bank obtains
positive expected profits if one of them offers a screening contract and the other offers a
collateralized contract. The reason is that some degree of asymmetric information prevails
as the screening signal is imperfect. However, each competing bank makes zero expected
profits if they both offer a collateralized contract. As banks try to maximize their profits
their incentive to offer collateralized credit contracts is distorted. Third, our analysis demon-
strates that from the perspective of social welfare bank competition may even be preferred.
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This happens for very low liquidation values. In this case, a monopolistic bank offers a
screening contract with the option to pledge collateral. Due to the high costs of liquidating
collateralized assets, this is expensive in terms of social welfare. In contrast, both competing
banks offer a screening contract. Thereby, they generate independent signals and reduce the
(social) costs of credit financing compared to the monopolistic case.
Moreover, our analysis shows that the policy conclusions, in particular how desirable bank
competition is, depend on the specific features of the banking sector and the environment
in which banks operate. The environment influences the liquidation value. The liquidation
value is higher if an asset is not firm-specific, if it is sold on a highly liquid market, and
if the costs of having an asset liquidated are low. The first two characteristics allow us to
compare different types of assets, the last two allow us to compare emerging and mature
markets. Only for high liquidation values is the type of contract independent of the degree of
competition. For intermediate liquidation values, we obtain the same result as most papers
on bank competition, namely that social welfare is highest in the case of a monopolistic
bank. If, however, the liquidation value is very low, bank competition increases welfare.
Thus, we conclude that in emerging markets (where secondary markets are rather illiquid
and the costs of liquidation are high) it is particularly important to have bank competition.
This paper is related to the literature on the choice between screening and collateraliza-
tion and on bank competition. Before we refer to the literature on the choice of contracts,
we explain how different types of contracts solve problems of asymmetric information and
how contracts are influenced by competition. Collateral is used to solve the adverse selection
problem. Firms with a lower default risk are more inclined to provide collateral. Thus, banks
offer contracts with different combinations of repayment and collateral. Through their choice
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firms reveal their default probability (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Collateral
is also used to mitigate the moral hazard problem (ex ante as well as ex post) by changing
the payoff structure (Bester, 1987, 1994).
Bank competition influences the terms of a credit contract and, as such, reduces the
amount of collateral demanded (Berlin and Butler, 2002; Hainz, 2003). At the same time,
the possibility of collateralization helps to increase bank competition. Entry barriers which
are caused by the information advantage of the incumbent bank (Dell’Ariccia, Friedman and
Marquez, 1999; Sharpe, 1990) can be contested by offering collateralized contracts (Sengupta,
2007). Alternatively, new lenders may use credit scoring based on hard information. This
new outside option improves the borrower’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the incumbent bank.
As a result, the incumbent bank’s incentive to lend gets distorted. This distortion can be
mitigated if firms pledge collateral (Inderst and Müller, 2006).
The seminal paper on screening is Broecker (1999), which analyzes credit contracts when
banks receive imperfect and independent signals from screening applicants. If there is bank
competition, a winner’s curse problem arises. It is shown that the average creditworthiness
of those firms which are financed decreases as the number of banks increases. Zazzaro (2005)
models the bank’s choice of the quality of the screening technology. He argues that contracts
should not be enforced strictly. If contracts are strictly enforced, the bank’s payoff in the
case of default increases and its risk decreases. Consequently, banks have a lower incentive
to improve their screening technology.
All these papers take the type of credit contract offered as given. Although collateral
and screening could be complements when information about borrowers is generated (like
in Inderst and Müller (2006)), in most papers they are substitutes. What are the trade-offs
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between different contractual modes? First, a screening and a pooling contract are compared
by Schnitzer (1999a). Banks decide whether to offer a pooling contract to all applying firms
independent of their type or a screening contract where banks get perfect information about
the firm provided they have invested in costly screening. For low screening costs, banks
obviously offer a screening contract. For higher screening costs, however, a bank’s decision
depends on the number of banks that do not screen. As a result, multiple equilibria occur
in which either all banks screen or no bank screens.
Second, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue that banks can offer a pooling contract
or a collateralized credit contract. By demanding collateral, banks get perfect information
on the risk type of the firm through the self-selection of firms. In this model, the costs of
collateralization arise because liquidation of assets incurs a deadweight loss. These results
imply that collateralization is the preferred contractual mode if the costs of liquidation are
low.
Third, Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) (henceforth MPP) compare screening and
collateralization; this is the paper which our model is most closely related to. In this model,
firms know their type, i.e., whether they have a high or low probability of success. By
pledging collateral they can reveal their type to the bank. However, banks could find out
the actual quality of firm, i.e., whether a firm is going to be successful or fail, by screening
them. Thus, banks can generate additional information by screening applicants. The bank
possesses a screening technology which generates perfect information, but causes a cost for
each applicant that is screened. In contrast, the costs of collateralization are that not only
successful firms receive a loan but also firms which will fail. As a result, a monopolistic
bank offers the first best contract because it bears the costs of collateralization or screening,
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respectively. For intermediate screening costs this is a screening contract.
In the case of bank competition, the costs a particular group of firms has to bear depend
on the contract offered. If a collateralized credit contract is offered, firms with a high (low)
probability of success face a repayment that not only covers their loan but also the expected
loss the bank makes through financing the failing firms among the other firms with a high
(low) probability of success. If a screening contract is offered, the good firms’ repayments
must cover the screening costs for all firms. For intermediate screening costs the competing
banks offer a separating contract as the firms with a high (low) probability of success prefer a
collateralized (screening) contract. For firms with a high probability of success, it is cheaper
to subsidize those firms with a high probability of success that in the end fail than to bear
the screening costs of all bad firms (with high and low probability of success). At the same
time, firms with a low probability of success prefer a screening contract since they would
have to cover the losses arising from financing the bad firms, which are more numerous in
this category of firms. In this parameter range, however, a screening contract maximizes
welfare. Thus, according to MPP, competing banks screen too little.
This result is in line with most of the literature on competition in banking (Cetorelli,
2001, summarizes recent contributions). The majority of papers conclude that competition
leads to an inefficient outcome. The sources of the inefficiency depend on the set-up of the
model. They can be the duplication of screening costs and the winner’s curse problem (as
in Broecker, 1990) or the incentive problems resulting out of them that, for instance, lead to
insufficient investment in screening by competing banks (as in Schnitzer, 1999a). However,
these papers only consider the banking sector. They neglect that the financing costs, which
decrease as banking becomes more competitive, have an important effect of the investment
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incentives of firms (Schnitzer, 1999b). The investment incentive determines the development
of the real sector of the economy and thereby feeds back into the stability of the financial
sector (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). In our model, bank competition can be optimal even
though we only consider the banking sector and neglect the impact on the real sector.
The result in MPP is quite intuitive given that they assume that banks can generate
some additional information. The aim of our paper is to study whether bank competition
indeed leads to inefficient collateralization given a banking system that is not capable of
generating additional information but aims to overcome the adverse selection problem. We
find that competing banks screen less often than a monopolistic bank. The reason is that
if one bank offers a screening contract and the other one a collateralized contract, some
degree of asymmetric information prevails as the screening signal is imperfect. Therefore,
competition is less intense than if both banks collateralize. Thus, the bank’s incentive
to soften competition drives our result whereas in MPP the inefficiency is caused by the
incentive of firms to separate in order to reduce the funding costs.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we set up the model and derive the contract
offered by a monopolistic bank. Moreover, we study the optimal contract offered in the case
of bank competition and show how the contract depends on the degree of competition in
the banking sector. In section 3, we analyze which contract would maximize social welfare
and evaluate the contracts offered in the case of bank competition and in the case of a
monopolistic bank from a social welfare point of view. Finally, we conclude in section 4.
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2. Model
2.1. Set-up
Before analyzing the credit contracts offered, we describe the characteristics of the borrowers
and the banking sector. The number of firms is normalized to 1; the share of good debtors
is μ and that of bad debtors is (1− μ). The good debtors have a project that is successful
with probability p. In the case of success the project’s payoff is X, in the case of failure it
is 0. The investment costs of the project are I. Thus, the expected payoff of a good firm is
pX − I, which we assume to be positive. Bad firms will fail with probability 1. The firms
are endowed with an asset endowment of A. However, due to the lack of own liquid funds,
the firms need to finance their investment through credit.
We consider two different market structures in the banking sector: there is either a
monopolistic bank or a competitive banking sector with two identical banks. Banks have
two means to discriminate between good and bad firms: they either offer a collateralized
credit contract which induces firms to signal their type, or they screen all firms applying for
credit by evaluating their credit proposals.
In the case of collateralization, the bank gets a payoff from the collateralized assets that
are liquidated if the project fails. There are costs associated with liquidation. Therefore,
the liquidation value of each unit of collateral, denoted by α, is lower than the continuation
value in the firm, i.e., α < 1. According to the Doing Business Report the recovery rate in
most regions of the world does not exceed 30 per cent (World Bank, 2006).2 If banks decide
to screen, they incur a cost c when screening a firm. By screening they receive a signal which
2Secured creditors may get a higher repayment, but even their payoff is still remarkably low in the case
of failure.
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reveals the firm’s type correctly with probability s, with s > 0.5.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, banks decide sequentially which
type of contract they offer. In the second stage, the banks determine simultaneously the
terms of the credit contract they offer. Modeling the first stage as a sequential decision
makes the exposition of the results clearer (because we do not have an equilibrium in mixed
strategies) but does not change our findings (see discussion in section 3.2).
2.2. Monopolistic Bank
A monopolistic bank makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firms. It can offer a screening
contract, a collateralized contract or a screening contract with the option for all those firms
that generated a negative signal to pledge collateral. The decision of the monopolistic bank
to offer a credit contract is based on the profit each of the different contracts generates. We
will study the different contracts and then determine which one is offered. In our set-up, the
monopolistic bank can offer a screening contract with the option to collateralize for all those
firms that generated a negative signal. In many credit markets, however, banks decide either
to accept applicants under the initial conditions or to reject them (Saunders and Thomas,
2001). Through this set-up, we put the monopolistic bank into a more favorable position
than competing banks and thereby make some of our results even stronger. We discuss the
implications of this assumption in section 3.2.
2.2.1. Collateralized Credit Contract
We first study a collateralized credit contract. Collateralization implies that the firm repays
an amount R in the case of success and that it loses collateral in the amount L in the case of
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failure. The credit contract has to be designed in a way that the bad firms have no incentive
to demand credit. This is reached through collateralization. The incentive compatibility
constraint for a bad firm can be written as:
I + (A− L) = A or (IC-F)
L = I
If a bad firm receives a loan in the amount of I, it will lose assets in the amount of L as
the project fails with certainty. Therefore, it is obvious that the amount of collateral that
prevents bad firms from applying for credit is I. The repayment R is determined according
to the participation constraint of good firms:
p (A+X −R) + (1− p) (A− I) ≥ A or (PC-F)
RLM ≤
pX − (1− p) I
p
If the project is successful, the good firms repay RLM from the payoff X they generate.
In the case of failure, collateralized assets in the amount of I are seized by the bank. The
expected payoff when the investment is credit-financed has to be at least as high as the payoff
from not investing. Since the monopolistic bank can extract the whole rent by demanding
RLM =
pX−(1−p)I
p
the firm retains A.
For the monopolistic bank the collateralized credit contract yields the following profit,
denoted by ΠLM :
Lemma 1. The expected profit of a monopolistic bank if it offers a collateralized credit
contract is ΠLM = μ (pX − (1− p) (1− α) I − I).
As Lemma 1 shows, the monopolistic bank can extract the total rent from the goods
firms. However, it also has to bear the total costs of collateralization because in the case
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of failure, which happens with probability (1− p), the collateralized assets yield a payoff of
αI. This implies that there is a loss in the case of liquidation in the amount of (1− α) I.
2.2.2. Screening Contract
If the monopolistic bank decides to screen its applicants, it has to incur the costs of evaluating
the credit proposals of c. As the quality of the signal is imperfect, only a fraction s of the
good firms will be financed (all the firms that generated a positive signal). Even more
importantly, a fraction (1− s) of bad firms gets credit as the bank receives a positive signal
about their quality. The monopolistic bank can extract all rents from the good firms. The
following lemma states the bank’s profit, denoted by ΠSM :
Lemma 2. The expected profit of a monopolistic bank if it offers a screening contract is
ΠSM = μs (pX − I)− (1− μ) (1− s) I − c.
2.2.3. Screening Contract with Collateralization
The monopolistic bank is aware of the fact that in the case of screening it denies credit-
worthy applicants loans because the result of the credit evaluation is false. Therefore, the
monopolistic bank may offer a collateralized credit contract to all firms that generated a
negative signal. As shown above, the conditions of a collateralized credit contract are such
that only good firms have an incentive to accept this contract. The following lemma shows
the bank’s profit, denoted by ΠSLM :
Lemma 3. The expected profit of a monopolistic bank if it offers a screening contract
and a collateralized credit contract to all firms which generate a negative signal is ΠSLM =
μ (pX − I)− (1− μ) I (1− s)− c− (1− s)μI (1− p) (1− α) .
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In this case all good firms receive a loan. Since the screening process is subject to mistakes
also a share of (1− s) bad firms are financed by the bank. Besides the screening costs, this
expected loss constitutes the costs of a collateralized contract. For all the good firms that
receive credit with collateralization the costs of collateralization are born by the monopolistic
bank. The bank has an incentive to offer the additional possibility of collateralization if the
expected costs of collateralization are below the return generated by financing the good firms
with the bad signal, i.e., (pX − I)− I (1− p) (1− α) ≥ 0. We assume that this is the case.
2.2.4. Contract Offered
We can derive which credit contract is optimal for the monopolistic bank by comparing the
profit levels. The threshold value of α where the decision to offer a contract changes is
denoted by αKM .
Proposition 1. The monopolistic bank offers a collateralized credit contract if αKM ≥
μI(1−sp)−(1−s)I−c
μsI(1−p) . Otherwise, it screens all applicants and finances good firms with a neg-
ative signal through a collateralized loan.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The monopolistic bank faces the following trade-off: in the case of collateralization, the
bank must bear the costs associated with the liquidation of the collateralized asset. In the
case of screening, the monopolistic bank has to incur screening costs for each applicant. More
importantly, it faces the risk of receiving an incorrect signal, which means that it finances
bad firms and misses financing good firms and thereby foregoes extracting rents. The mo-
nopolistic bank can avoid denying credit to good firms and thereby extract rents from them
by offering a contract with screening and collateralization. For this reason, the screening
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contract is dominated by the combined contract and is not offered. Whenever the liquidation
value of collateral exceeds the threshold value αKM , it is optimal to use collateralization.
If the costs of screening c increase, the threshold value decreases. As expected, the critical
liquidation value increases as s and I increase. A higher I means that the costs of liquidation
increase as the amount of collateral increases. A better screening technology reduces the
losses of financing bad projects. Our model shows that the degree of collateralization is not
only influenced by the liquidation value of collateral but also by the capability of the bank
to generate information through screening.
2.3. Competitive Banking Sector
We capture bank competition in a model with two banks that engage in Bertrand compe-
tition. We assume that firms can apply for only one contract at each bank (MPP make
a similar assumption). Firms will apply at both banks and choose the best offer because
they do not have any costs of submitting credit proposals. Before we can study the type
of contract offered in equilibrium, we must first derive the terms of the credit contract if
both banks collateralize, second the terms of the credit contract if both banks screen and
finally the terms of the credit contract if one bank screens and the other bank collateralizes.
Then, we determine the conditions under which a particular contract is offered. However,
due to the assumption that firms can apply for only one contract at each bank, banks do not
offer combined contracts where firms are screened and those with a negative signal have the
chance to get a loan when they pledge collateral (which is in line how Saunders and Thomas
(2001) describe many credit markets).3
3An alternative explanation of why banks do not offer combined contracts are fixed costs for developing
either a screening technology in addition to expertise in collateralization (or vice versa). Suppose that
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2.3.1. Both Banks Collateralize
As shown for the monopolistic bank, the incentive compatibility constraint of the bad firm
implies that collateral L = I. Since banks are competing, they will demand a repayment
R that guarantees that they are making zero expected profit, i.e., the bank’s participation
constraint is:
pR+ (1− p)αI − I = 0 or
R = I
1− (1− p)α
p
The good firm’s participation constraint is always fulfilled as we have assumed that the
investment is efficient, i.e. pX−I > 0. The payoff a firm receives with a collateralized credit
contract (superscript L) is denoted by PL, the bank’s profit by ΠL. Note that we do not use
subscripts in the case of bank competition.
Lemma 4. If the banks offer a collateralized credit contract, a good firm receives an ex-
pected payoff of PL = pX − I (1 + (1− α) (1− p)) and banks make zero expected profits,
ΠL = 0.
2.3.2. Both Banks Screen
The signals that banks generate are imperfect and independent of each other.4 It is quite
realistic to use imperfect signals because the empirical literature shows that banks rate
banks could offer a combined contract and screening is relatively cheaper than collateralization in generating
information. Then a bank providing a collateralized credit contract would finance only a share of (1− s)2
good firms since firms accept a collateralized credit contract only if they do not receive an offer after being
screened by both banks.
4The set-up of this section is similar to the model by Broecker (1990).
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the default risk of a particular borrower differently (Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach, 2006;
Mitchell and van Roy, 2007). In a study on Sweden, the authors take into account that the
banks use different rating classes which might reduce the correlation between their screening
results and they correct for all possible distortions caused by this fact. Nevertheless, the
correlation varies between 0.75 and 0.8 (Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach, 2006). In a study
on Belgium, a simulation shows that “[...] between sixteen and twenty percent of applicants
would find their loan applications rejected by one bank but accepted by the other [...]”
(Mitchell and van Roy, 2007, p. 4).
The timing of events for the second stage (the determination of the interest rate) is as
follows: The banks announce the interest rates. Firms submit their credit proposals at
both banks. Like above assume that there are no costs for the firms of submitting a credit
proposal. The banks screen them, and accept those with a positive signal. Firms choose
the most favorable credit offer (and we call these firms the first group), implying that firms
accept any credit contract offered if they receive only one offer (and we call these firms the
second group). There is no information sharing between the banks about the signals of a
particular customer. Of course, the banks are aware of the adverse selection problem existing
between them. They take into account the fact that this second group of applicants is of
poorer quality, although they do not know which particular firm has been rejected by their
competitor.
The banks determine their repayment as follows. Banks are willing to offer credit with
certainty if the expected payoff from demanding the highest repaymentX and being undercut
by the competing bank is non-negative. We assume that this is indeed the case. Formally,
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this condition is given by:
ΠS = μ (1− s) s (pX − I)− (1− μ) s (1− s) I − c (2.1)
= (1− s) s (μ (pX − I)− (1− μ) I)− c ≥ 0 (2.2)
The expected profit of demandingX consists of the rent, pX−I, that a bank can extract from
those good firms that have been denied credit in the first round and now are screened to be
good. However, the bank also has to cover the loss made with bad firms that have been denied
credit in the first round and on which it receives a favorable signal, i.e., (1− μ) s (1− s) I.
Moreover, the evaluation of each credit proposal causes a cost of c since all firms apply at
each of the two banks.
Each other repayment has to generate the same return for the bank. This condition can
be used to derive the lowest repayment, denoted by RS. However, for the repayment RS
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose both banks offer the same repayment.
Then, applicants from the first group would go to each bank with equal probability. Suppose
that this RS yields zero expected profit for the banks. Then, marginally undercutting would
discontinuously increase the profit of a bank because all applicants from the first group
would apply for credit at this bank. By undercutting, the bank can improve the pool of
applicants significantly and therefore makes a non-negative expected profit. This would
hold for all RS ≥ RS. No bank would reduce the repayment below RS because it makes a
negative expected profit although it serves the whole market. For the competitor the optimal
answer would be to demand X from all applicants in the second group, which are rejected
by its competitor. However, in this situation demanding RS is no longer optimal. Thus,
no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. The mixed strategy equilibrium is described in the
following proposition:
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Lemma 5. The mixed strategy equilibrium has the following features: The banks demand
a repayment from the range
k
s(μpX−I)(1−s)+I(1−s(1−μ)−μ(1−s))
μsp ,X
l
, according to the following
cumulative distribution function F (R) = μs
2(pR−I)−I(1−μ)(1−s)2−μs(1−s)p(X−R)
μs2(pR−I)−I(1−μ)(1−s)2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The following lemma shows the firm’s expected payoff, denoted by P S, and the bank’s
expected profits. E

RS

denotes the expected repayment.
Lemma 6. If the banks offer a screening contract, the expected payoff of a good firm is PS =
p

X −E

RS

s (2− s) and banks make an expected profit of ΠS = μ (1− s) s (pX − I)−
(1− μ) s (1− s) I − c.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The advantage of bank competition for a good firm is that it has the chance to receive
credit from bank 2 if it is denied credit by bank 1 and vice versa. The probability to receive
credit is thus s (2− s). The repayment is influenced by the screening quality of the bank.
The repayment determines the extent to which bad firms are subsidized by good firms. It
also influences the banks’ profit which they can earn by serving the good firms in the second
group. The latter profit level determines the expected bank profit ΠS.
2.3.3. One Bank Screens, One Bank Collateralizes
Suppose bank 1 offers a collateralized credit contract and bank 2 offers a screening contract.
In this case, the repayment bank 1 demands is denoted by RLS (the first superscript shows
the choice of the bank we consider and the second the competitor’s choice). The timing of
events is equivalent to what was described in section 2.3.2. The firms behave as follows:
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Firms submit their credit proposal at both banks simultaneously and the banks decide on
the contract terms. Firms demand credit from the bank that offers the lowest expected
repayment.
Suppose that bank 1 offers a collateralized credit contract which determines a repayment,
denoted by RLS, and collateral L = I that provide the same expected payoffs to a good firm
as the screening contract with repayment RSL. What would then be bank 1’s profit? We
have to calculate the payoffs of a good firm with different types of contracts. A good firm is
indifferent between the contracts if:
p

X −RLS

− (1− p) I = p

X −RSL

or if the collateralized contract offers L = I and RLS = RSL − I(1−p)
p
.
There is no equilibrium in pure strategies when the contract terms are determined, for
the same reason as before. Each repayment has to generate a profit of ΠLS for bank 1, which
is the rent a bank can demand by offering a collateralized credit contract with combination of
L and the highest possible repayment RLS. Only those good firms that generated a negative
signal at the competing bank will choose this contract. Therefore, this condition can be used
to derive the equilibrium in mixed strategies which is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 7. The mixed strategy equilibrium has the following features:5
(i) If α ≤ α2 = μs(1−s)(pX−I)+μs
2I(1−p)−I(1−μ)(1−s)−c
μs2I(1−p) , bank 1 demands collateral L = I
and a repayment RLS from the range
k
RLSα≤α2 , R
L
M
l
according to the following cumulative
distribution function F

RLS

= (s−1)(pX−I)−sI(1−p)(1−α)+pR
LS−pI
p(RLS−I) and prob(R
LS = X) =
5The threshold value α2 is denoted this way because it is used for comparisons in the following
propositions.
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(1−s)(pX−I)+sI(1−p)(1−α)
p(RLS−I) . The expected profit of bank 1 is
ΠLS = (1− s)μ (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α)) .
Bank 2 offers a screening contract and demands a repaymentRSL from the range
k
RSLα≤α2 ,X
l
,
according to the cumulative distribution function G

RSL

= pR
SL−sI−(1−s)(pX)−sI(1−p)(1−α)
s((pRSL−I)−I(1−p)(1−α)) .
The expected profit of bank 2 is
ΠSL = μs (1− s) (pX − I)− I (1− s) (1− μ) + s2μI (1− α) (1− p)− c.
(ii) If α > α2, bank 1 demands collateral L = I and a repayment RLS from the range
k
RSLα>α2,X
l
and bank 2 offers a screening contract and demands a repayment RSL from
the range
k
RSLα>α2 ,X
l
. The cumulative distribution functions are the same as in case (i).
However, the expected profit of bank 2 is ΠSL = 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Bank 1, which offers the collateralized credit contract, can always secure itself a positive
payoff of ΠLS since it has the outside option of serving all the good firms of the second group
and demanding X from them. As Lemma 7 shows, bank 1 will demand the repayment X
with positive probability. The expected profit of bank 2 also depends on the liquidation
value α. For low enough liquidation values bank 2 makes positive profits as well because
its screening technology involves comparatively lower costs than collateralization. Bank 2
mixes continuously over the whole range of repayments. If the liquidation value exceeds
a certain threshold, collateralizing is more cost-efficient. This reduces bank 2’s position in
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the competitive environment and it thus makes zero expected profits. Bank 2 demands the
minimum repayment with positive probability. Moreover, the minimum repayment has to
be higher than in the case of α ≤ α2 in order to guarantee a non-negative profit.
2.3.4. Contract Offered
So far, we have derived the terms of all possible combinations of contracts which can be
offered. Solving the game by backward induction, we determine the type of contract which
is offered in equilibrium. The banks sequentially choose the type of contract offered, with
bank 1 acting first. We assume that banks offer a collateralized credit contract if both
contracts generate the same return, since in case of collateralization the number of bad loans
is lower. The banks compare their payoffs with the different types of contracts. Depending
on the parameter values, we obtain the following equilibria:
Proposition 2. The contracts offered in equilibrium by competing banks depend on the
liquidation value:
• If α < α1, both banks screen.
• If α1 ≤ α < μs2I(1−p)−μ(pX−I)(1−s)
2−I(1−s)(1−2μ+μp)−c
(1−p)(1−s+s2)Iμ , bank 1 screens and bank 2 collat-
eralizes.
• If μs2I(1−p)−μ(pX−I)(1−s)2−I(1−s)(1−2μ+μp)−c
(1−p)(1−s+s2)Iμ ≤ α < α2, bank 1 collateralizes and bank 2
screens.
• If α ≥ α2, both banks collateralize.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Unless both banks offer a collateralized credit contract, banks are able to extract rents
from their customers. This is due to the fact that for α < α2, collateralization, which enables
the firms to reveal their type, is relatively costly. Thus, at least one bank offers a screening
contract. In this case, there is no longer perfect competition. The reason is that good
firms are potentially denied credit by (at least) one bank because the signal is imperfect.
If good firms receive only one credit offer, they accept the loan contract even if they have
to give up the whole rent. However, the banks cannot discriminate between firms which
receive an alternative offer (first group of applicants) and those who do not (second group of
applicants). Therefore, they increase their repayments relative to the perfectly competitive
case and make positive expected profit.
When deciding which contract to offer banks compare the profits of the different contracts.
Since bank 1 moves first, it can reap a first mover advantage. Bank 2 optimizes its offer given
the contract offered by bank 1. For very low liquidation values, i.e., α < α1, both banks
offer a screening contract. Since screening is relatively cheaper, the profit extracted through
this type of contract is high. The reason why banks can extract rents is that firms which
receive an offer from one bank do not receive an offer from the other bank with certainty.
Therefore, they are willing to repay as much as X. Banks exploit this situation by demanding
higher repayments. If the liquidation value increases, bank 1 still offers a screening contract.
But now, it is optimal for bank 2 to offer a collateralized contract since it avoids denying
credit to good firms. For even higher liquidation values it is optimal for bank 1 to offer a
collateralized credit contract. In order to avoid the scenario of perfect competition with zero
expected profit, bank 2 offers a screening contract. Finally, if the liquidation value is above
α2, both banks offer a collateralized credit contract.
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2.4. Comparison between Monopolistic Bank and Competing Banks
The crucial question is how the market structure in the banking sector influences the credit
contract offered. To answer this question, we compare the threshold values of the liquidation
values for which the contract changes under the different scenarios of competition, monop-
olistic bank and two banks. Thus, the threshold values for the competitive scenario are α1
and α2; for the monopolistic scenario there is only the threshold value αKM .
Proposition 3. (i) Suppose that the liquidation value is very low, i.e., α < α1, then the
monopolistic bank offers a contract with screening and collateralization whereas the com-
peting banks offer a screening contract.
(ii) Suppose that the liquidation value is low, i.e., α1 ≤ α < αKM , then the monopolistic bank
offers a contract with screening and collateralization whereas in the case of competition, one
bank offers a screening contract and the other bank a collateralized credit contract.
(iii) Suppose that the liquidation value is high, i.e., αKM ≤ α < α2, then the monopolistic
bank offers a collateralized credit contract whereas in the case of competition, again one
bank offers a screening contract and the other bank a collateralized credit contract.
(iv) Suppose that the liquidation value is very high, i.e., α ≥ α2, then the monopolistic as
well as the competing banks offer a collateralized credit contract.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The monopolistic bank is the residual claimant and therefore has to bear the costs of
collateralization. Thus, it always chooses the contract with the lowest costs. As long as
the liquidation value is not high, i.e., α < αKM , the optimal contract involves screening and
offering a collateralized credit contract to all those firms that have generated a negative
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Figure 2.1: Comparison between Monopolistic Bank and Competing Banks
signal. Only if the liquidation value is high or very high does the monopolistic bank offer
a collateralized credit contract, because then the expected costs of liquidating collateralized
assets are lower than the costs of a screening contract (see Figure 2.1 for an illustration).
The contracts offered by competing banks not only change at different threshold values than
in the monopolistic case. Moreover, for very low liquidation values, both competing banks
offer a screening contract. For low liquidation values, one of the banks offers a screening
contract, the other one a collateralized credit contract. This asymmetry in contract offers
yields positive profits to both banks. For high liquidation values, the competing banks still
offer a screening and a collateralized contract whereas a monopolistic bank offers only a
collateralized credit contract. The reason is that the competing banks would make zero
expected profits if they both offered a collateralized contract. Therefore, they have an
incentive to offer different types of contracts. Since bank 1 moves first and its offer is
observable, bank 2 responds by offering a different type of contract. Thereby, each of the
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two banks makes positive expected profits. Only if the liquidation value is very high is a
collateralized credit contract offered independently of the market structure.
In contrast to MPP, we find that competing banks screen less often than a monopolistic
bank. The reason is that if one bank offers a screening contract and the other a collateralized
contract, some degree of asymmetric information prevails as the screening signal is imperfect.
Therefore, competition is less intense if both banks collateralize. Thus, the bank’s incentive
to soften competition drives our result whereas in MPP the inefficiency is caused by the
incentive of firms to separate.
3. Welfare Analysis
3.1. Optimal Contract
We want to evaluate the contract choice in terms of efficiency. Therefore, we study a social
planner that maximizes the expected payoff of investment net of any costs. In the context
of our model, the costs of financing depend on the degree of competition and the type of
contract offered (which is denoted by V ). Both determinants are influenced by the size of
the costs of collateralization relative to the screening costs.6 In the case of a monopolistic
bank social welfare is given by:
SW
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
= ΠSLM = μ (pX − I)− (1− s) I ((1− μ)− μ (1− p) (1− α))− c if V = S,L
= ΠLM = μ (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α)) if V = L
6Note that in this model the liquidation value represents the proceeds the bank receives as creditor. The
social costs from liquidation might well be lower than the deadweight loss from liquidation. The reason is
that the buyer of the asset may have a higher willingness to pay than is reflected by the liquidation value.
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In the case of bank competition social welfare is given by:
SW
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
= s (2− s)μ (pX − I)− (1− s2) (1− μ) I − 2c if V = S
< ΠSLM = μ (pX − I)− (1− s) I ((1− μ)− μ (1− p) (1− α))− c if V = S,L
= μ (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α)) if V = L
If both banks screen, s (2− s) good firms that contribute to social welfare, and (1− s2)
bad firms that reduce social welfare, receive loans. If one bank collateralizes and the other
bank screens, we only state the upper bound of social welfare. This upper bound is identical
to the social welfare in the case of a monopolistic bank. The monopolistic bank offers
collateralization to those firms which generate a negative signal. Only the good firms among
them are willing to offer collateral. In the case of bank competition, the firms demand credit
from the bank with the lowest offer. Since banks mix over repayments, it is not clear which
bank wins a customer, i.e., whether a customer that gets two offers is served by the bank
with the lowest cost contract. Therefore, the actual social welfare depends on which bank
wins the competition and, thus, on the cumulative density functions of both banks. In order
to facilitate the exposition of the social welfare function, we only show the upper bound. If
both banks collateralize, all good firms contribute to social welfare, which is reduced by the
costs of collateralization.
What is the socially optimal structure of the banking sector and which contracts are
offered? The answer is provided in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. (i) If the liquidation value is below the lower threshold value, i.e., α ≤
(1−s)(−(1−s)μ(pX−I)+I((μ(1−p)−(1−μ)s)))−c
μ(1−p)(1−s)I , the social planner allows two banks to enter the market
which offer a screening contract and produce two independent signals.
(ii) If the liquidation value is intermediate, i.e., (1−s)(−(1−s)μ(pX−I)+I((μ(1−p)−(1−μ)s)))−cμ(1−p)(1−s)I < α ≤
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α2, the social planner allows market entry of only one bank. The monopolistic bank offers a
screening contract with collateralization for α ≤ αKM and a collateralized credit contract for
αKM < α ≤ α2.
(iii) If the liquidation value is above the higher threshold, i.e., α > α2, then the social
planner is indifferent between a banking market with one or two banks since both offer a
collateralized credit contract and produce the same social welfare.
Proof: See the Appendix.
As part (i) of the proposition states, below a certain threshold value collateralization
is very expensive. The monopolistic bank offers a screening contract with the option to
collateralize whereas competing banks offer only screening contracts. Note that both banks
generate signals on the creditworthiness of a borrower independently of each other and that
the second signal is such that financing firms according to this signal increases welfare.
Consequently, the behavior of a monopolistic bank is less efficient than the behavior of
competing banks.
For intermediate liquidation values (part (ii)), a monopolistic bank generates higher
social welfare. Since the competing banks randomize on their repayments, it is not possible
to assure that the screening contract, which is the type of contract causing the lower costs,
is preferred by the firms. Due to competition, the firms demand credit from the bank with
the lowest offer, which is not necessarily made by the bank with the lowest cost of generating
information. However, a monopolistic bank minimizes this cost and is therefore preferred by
the social planner. Finally, if the liquidation value exceeds the threshold value of α2 (part
(iii)), the terms of a credit contract are independent of the degree of competition. Therefore,
a social planner is indifferent between market structures.
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3.2. Discussion of Results
In our analysis we assumed that financing the applicants from the second group which gen-
erate a positive signal yields a non-negative profit for the bank, or
ΠS = (1− s) s (μ (pX − I)− (1− μ) I)− c ≥ 0. How would the results change if we aban-
don this assumption? Then, generating a second signal is inefficient and social welfare is
maximized if there is only one bank. The simulation for the Belgian banking sector offers
some indication on the quality of the screening signal. According to Mitchell and van Roy
(2007), (1− s) s ≈ 0.2 implying that s ≈ 0.7. However, in many countries, in particular in
emerging markets, the screening technology of banks is often not very sophisticated yet (or
s is lower). Since ∂Π
S
∂s < 0, it should be efficient from a social welfare perspective to have
more than one signal on the firm’s creditworthiness.
In order to make our results as clear as possible, we restrict our analysis to only two
banks. The same intuition would apply to a banking sector with more banks. The condition
on the number n of banks active in the market is that the nth signal generated yields a
non-negative payoff for the bank which bases its lending decision on this signal.
Moreover, we set up a model in which the decisions about the type of the credit contract
offered are made sequentially. In a game with simultaneous offers, both banks would offer
screening and collateralized contracts with positive probability. We would obtain an equi-
librium in mixed strategies for the type of contract offered. Thus, the qualitative features
of our model remain the same. Also, the threshold values where the banks’ choice switches
from offering a screening contract only to offering different contracts (α1), and from offering
different contracts to collateralized contracts only (α2) do not change. However, the amount
of social welfare changes if bank 1 and bank 2 randomize over the choice of contracts. But
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in this parameter range, the monopolistic bank still remains optimal from a social welfare
perspective and thus our welfare results are robust to changes in the timing of the choice of
contracts.
We made two assumptions that are in favor of a monopolistic bank. First, we assumed
that the monopolistic bank can offer a collateralized contract to those firms that generated a
bad signal. This assumption increases the welfare in the case of a monopolistic bank as the
liquidation value is rather low. Despite this assumption which is in favor of the monopolistic
bank, we find a parameter range (see Proposition 4, condition (i)) where competing banks
generate a higher social welfare. Without this assumption, this parameter range would
be even larger. Second, we assumed that a monopolistic bank has an incentive to offer a
screening contract with the additional possibility to collateralize even if the liquidation value
is very low. Suppose that this assumption does not hold. Then, for very low liquidation
values it would be optimal for the monopolistic bank to offer a screening contract. In
this case, social welfare would definitely be lower in the case of the monopolistic bank as
producing a second screening signal increases welfare.
4. Conclusion
We started out with the question of how desirable collateralization is and how bank compe-
tition influences a bank’s choice between a screening and a collateralized contract. We find
that the monopolistic offers a collateralized contract if it is efficient. However, competing
bank offer collateralized contracts less often than a monopolistic bank. Our analysis has im-
portant implications for the desirability of bank competition. Most other papers, including
MPP, show that only a monopolistic bank offers the first best contract for the whole parame-
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ter range. Our analysis goes one step further and compares the effects of bank competition
for different liquidation values (relative to the bank’s screening skills). For high liquidations
values the degree of bank competition does not play a role for the efficiency of the provision
of loans. This is the case for industries in developed economies where highly liquid assets are
used as collateral. For intermediate liquidation values, we indeed find that a monopolistic
bank is superior as it offers the first best contract. For very low liquidation values, however,
bank competition generates higher levels of social welfare. Competition allows generation of
more than one signal on the profitability of a project. If the quality of the signal is rather
low, it is desirable for a firm and, even more importantly, for the social planner to have more
than one bank that screens. Suppose there is only a monopolistic bank with a mediocre
screening technology. Then, this single screening result alone would determine whether a
firm gets a loan or not.
In emerging markets, in particular, we expect to find situations where the liquidation
value is low in absolute and in relative terms and the screening technique is mediocre. With
competition and the same mediocre screening technology, a creditworthy firm has a second
chance if the test provides an incorrect signal. Thus, by explicitly taking into account the
difference in liquidation values, we demonstrate that the results crucially depend on the
parameter range. This implies that policy recommendations will differ significantly across
economies. Moreover, as banks, in particular in developed economies, take many different
types of assets as collateral and thus the liquidation values differ substantially, there is no
clear-cut policy recommendation on the desired level of bank competition. However, policy
makers could improve the situation by increasing the assets’ liquidation values, for instance,
by increasing the liquidity of secondary markets.
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The welfare analysis clearly shows that social welfare increases in the liquidation values.
One obvious reason is that the losses through liquidation decrease. But higher liquidation
values have the additional advantage that independent of the degree of bank competition the
efficient contract is offered. The policy recommendations depend on the source for costs of
liquidation. In developed economies, liquidation values of assets are low if assets are traded
on illiquid secondary markets. In particular, in times of financial crises secondary markets
can be illiquid. Banks will take into account such a situation when evaluating the expected
liquidation value of collateral. Governments should take actions that help to increase the
liquidity of secondary markets. In emerging markets, low liquidation values are in addition
caused by the poor legal and institutional environment. The most fundamental measure is
thus to establish secure property rights as a prerequisite for collateralization, for instance,
by making cadastre work. In addition, measures should be taken that reduce the costs of
collateralization, for example, by speeding up the decision of courts.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that ΠSM < ΠSLM . Therefore we compare
ΠLM = μ (pX − (1− p) (1− α) I − I)
≥ μ (pX − I)− (1− μ) I (1− s)− c− (1− s)μI (1− p) (1− α) = ΠSLM
for αKM described in the proposition. Q.E.D.
5.2. Proof of Lemma 5
We determine the equilibrium in mixed strategies as described in the lemma.
• If the bank offers the lowest repayment RS, it will attract all firms that are offered
credit by the competitor and, of course, the firms that do not have an alternative offer.
The bank’s expected payoff is:
q
μ

s2

pRS − I

− (1− μ) (1− s)2 I
r
+
q
μ (1− s) s

pRS − I

− (1− μ) s (1− s) I
r
− c
= ΠS
The first brace captures the expected payoff from the first group of applicants, the
second those of the second group. All firms from the first group demand credit from
this bank because it demands the lowest repayment. Good firms among the applicants
from the first group will receive credit with probability s2. Bad firms are financed with
probability (1− s)2. The probabilities s2 and (1− s)2 are the probabilities with which
32
good and bad firms, respectively, receive offers from both banks. The second group
consists of all firms that are denied credit by the competing bank. Thus, it consists of
a share of μ (1− s) good firms and (1− μ) s bad firms. Only those of the second group
that were already rejected by the competitor and now generate a positive signal receive
a loan. The minimum repayment is given by RS = s(μpX−I)(1−s)+I(1−s(1−μ)−μ(1−s))μsp .
• Consider the profit function of bank i (i 9= j) conditional on bank j’s offer.
Πi(Ri) = (1− Fj (Ri))

μs2

pRSC − I

− (1− μ) (1− s)2 I

+

μ (1− s) s

pRSC − I

− (1− μ) s ((1− s) I)

− c ∀ Ri"
k
RSC ,X

.
Let us use the fact that Πi(Rj) = Π
S
C for each repayment.
• For bank j we determine Fj(Ri) by setting
Πi(Ri) = (1− Fj (Ri))

μs2

pRSC − I

− (1− μ) (1− s)2 I

+

μ (1− s) s

pRSC − I

− (1− μ) s (1− s) I

− c = ΠSC
Since both banks are identical Fj (Ri) = Fi (Rj) ≡ F (R) with
F (R) = μs
2(pR−I)−I(1−μ)(1−s)2−μs(1−s)p(X−R)
μs2(pR−I)−I(1−μ)(1−s)2 . Thus, both banks demand a repayment from the
range
k
s(μpX−I)(1−s)+I(1−s(1−μ)−μ(1−s))
μsp , X
l
according to F (R). Note that F (X) = 1. Q.E.D.
5.3. Proof of Lemma 6
Good firms receive the expected payoff of p

X −E

RS

with probability s (2− s). The
profit of the bank is the expected interest rate revenue net of the losses from financing bad
borrowers and the screening costs. Q.E.D.
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5.4. Proof of Lemma 7
Step 0: We argue that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose bank 1 offers a
collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening contract. Assume that both banks demand the
same expected repayment. The first group of applicants would go to each bank with equal
probability. Suppose that this repayment yields zero expected profit for bank 1. Bank 2
could marginally undercut this price and would make a positive profit because all applicants
from the first group would apply for credit at this bank. However, for bank 1 it would be
optimal to serve all those good firms that were denied credit by bank 2. From these firms
bank 1 could extract all rents by demanding repayment RLS = RLM =
pX−(1−p)I
p
and L = I.
Then, the profit of bank 1 is ΠLS = μ (1− s) (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α)). The best response
of bank 2 to
q
RLS = RLM ;L = I
r
would be to demand repayment RSL = X − ε. Thus, no
equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Step 1: Determine the expected for bank 1 if it demands the highest repayment RLS =
pX−(1−p)I
p
and collateral L = I and serves only second round applicants because it is undercut
by bank 2.
Then, the payoff of bank 1 which offers a collateralized contract provided that bank 2
offers a screening contract is given by:
ΠLS = μ (1− s)
#
p
#
pX − (1− p) I
p
$
+ (1− p)αI − I
$
= μ (1− s) (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α))
We assume that ΠLS > 0. Suppose that bank 1 serves the whole market. The lowest
repayment bank 1 demands is determined by the expected profit ΠLS. Thus, RLS is given
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by
ΠLS = μ

pRLS + (1− p)αI − I

= μ (1− s) (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α)) .
Therefore, the contract with the lowest repayment specifies
q
RLS = (1−s)μ(pX−I)+μsI(1−p)(1−α)+μpI
pμ , I
r
. The debtor is indifferent between this collateral-
ized credit contract and a screening contract if the repayment with a screening contract is
RSL = pX(1−s)+sI(1−p)(1−α)+sI
p
.
Step 2: We assume that for bank 1, ΠLS

RLS

> 0, and determine the mixed strategies
for bank 2 as described in Lemma 7.
The cumulative distribution function for bank 2, denoted by G(R), is given by the fol-
lowing condition:
ΠLS = (1−G)

μ

pRSL + (1− p)αI − I

+G (1− s)

μ

pRSL + (1− p)αI − I

or
(1−G)

μ

pRSL + (1− p)αI − I

+G (1− s)

μ

pRSL + (1− p)αI − I

= μ (1− s) (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α))
As a result, G

RSL

= pR
SL−sI−(1−s)(pX)−sI(1−p)(1−α)
s((pRSL−I)−I(1−p)(1−α)) .
Step 3: Suppose α ≤ α2 = μs(1−s)(pX−I)+μs
2I(1−p)−I(1−μ)(1−s)−c
μs2I(1−p) implying that
ΠSL

RSL = pX(1−s)+sI(1−p)(1−α)+sI
p

> 0. We determine the equilibrium in mixed strategies
as described in the Lemma 7 (i).
The expected profit of bank 2 demanding RSL = pX(1−s)+sI(1−p)(1−α)+sI
p
is given by
ΠSL = μs (1− s)
#
p
#
pX (1− s) + sI (1− p) (1− α) + sI
p
$
− I
$
− I (1− s) (1− μ)− c
= μs (1− s) (pX − I)− I (1− s) (1− μ) + s2μI (1− α) (1− p)− c
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Note that ΠSL > 0 if α ≤ α2 = μs(1−s)(pX−I)+μs
2I(1−p)−I(1−μ)(1−s)−c
μs2I(1−p) .
The cumulative distribution function for bank 1, denoted by F (R), is determined by:
ΠSL = (1− F )

μ

s

pRLS − I

− (1− μ) ((1− s) I)

+ F (− (1− μ) ((1− s) I))− c
= μs (1− s) (pX − I)− I (1− s) (1− μ) + s2μI (1− α) (1− p)− c
As as result, F

RLS

= (s−1)(pX−I)−sI(1−p)(1−α)+pR
LS−pI
p(RLS−I) . Bank 1 demands collateral L =
I and repayments from the range
k
RLS, pX−(1−p)I
p
l
. Note that F

(1−s)μ(pX−I)+μsI(1−p)(1−α)+μpI
pμ

=
0 and F

pX−(1−p)I
p

< 1. Thus, with probability 1−F

pX−(1−p)I
p

bank 1 demands pX−(1−p)I
p
as a repayment.
Bank 2 demands a repayment RSL from the range
k
RSL,X
l
, according to the cumulative
distribution function G

RSL

= pR
SL−sI−(1−s)(pX)−sI(1−p)(1−α)
s((pRSL−I)−I(1−p)(1−α)) . Note that G

RSL

= 0 and
G (X) = 1.
Step 4: Suppose α > α2 implying that ΠLS

RSL = pX(1−s)+sI(1−p)(1−α)+sI
p

≤ 0. We deter-
mine the equilibrium in mixed strategies as described in Lemma 7 (ii).
Thus, bank 2 needs at least a repayment of RSL = I(1−μ)(1−s)+μsI+cμsp in order to break-
even. Thus, its expected profit is ΠLS = 0. A debtor is indifferent between a screen-
ing contract determining RSL = I(1−μ)(1−s)+μsI+cμsp and a collateralized credit contract with
q
L = I, RLS = I(1−μ)(1−s)+μspI+cμps
r
. The latter condition therefore determines the lower bound
of the range from which bank 1 demands its repayment.
The cumulative distribution function for bank 1, denoted by F (R), is determined by:
(1− F )

μ

s

pRLS − I

− (1− μ) ((1− s) I)

+ F (− (1− μ) ((1− s) I))− c = 0
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As a result, F

RLS

= μspR
LS−μsI−μsIp−I+Is+Iμ−c
μsp(RLS−I) . Bank 1 demands collateral L = I and
repayments from the range
k
RLS, pX−(1−p)I
p
l
. Note that F

RLS

= 0 and F

pX−(1−p)I
p

< 1.
Thus, with probability 1− F (X) bank 1 demands pX−(1−p)I
p
as a repayment.
Bank 2 demands a repayment RSL from the range
k
RSL,X
l
, according to the following
cumulative distribution function
G

RSL

= pR
SL−sI−(1−s)(pX)−sI(1−p)(1−α)
s((pRSL−I)−I(1−p)(1−α)) . Note that G

RSL

> 0 and G (X) = 1. Q.E.D.
5.5. Proof of Proposition 2
The profit when a screening contract is offered is ΠS. The profit with a collateralized contract
is ΠL. The bank obtains a profit of ΠSL if it screens and the competitor collateralizes and a
profit of ΠLS if it collateralizes when the competitor screens. We first investigate when it is
optimal for bank 1 to offer a screening contract and state the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Suppose bank 2 offers a screening contract. It is optimal for bank 1 to offer
a screening contract if α < α1 = μ(2s−1)(pX−I)+Iμ(1−p)(1−s)−s
2(μpX−I)−sI(1−μ)−c
Iμ(1−p)(1−s) and to offer a
collateralized contract if α ≥ α1.
Proof: Suppose bank 1 intends to screen. We compare bank 1’s profit if bank 2 collater-
alizes

ΠLS

and if bank 2 screens as well

ΠS

. We can show that
ΠLS −ΠS
= (1− s)μ (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α))
− (μ (1− s) (s (pX − I))− (1− μ) s ((1− s) I)− c)
which is positive if α ≥ α1 = μ(2s−1)(pX−I)+Iμ(1−p)(1−s)−s
2(μpX−I)−sI(1−μ)−c
Iμ(1−p)(1−s) .
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Q.E.D.
Bank 1 takes the reaction of bank 2 into consideration if it decides on the type of contract
it offers. Provided that bank 2 offers a screening contract, bank 1 offers a screening contract
as well as long as the screening costs are relatively low. Bank 1 chooses to offer a collateralized
contract, if screening becomes relatively more costly as the liquidation value increases.
Bank 1 first determines the type of contract it offers. Then bank 2 decides. Thus, bank
1 takes into account the decision of bank 2. Therefore, we solve the problem by backward
induction.
(1) Suppose α < α1:
The payoffs for bank 2 are
• if both banks offer a screening contract:
ΠS = μ (1− s) (s (pX − I))− (1− μ) s ((1− s) I)− c
• if bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a collateralized contract:
ΠLS = μ (1− s) (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α))
• if bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening contract:
ΠSL = μs (1− s) (pX − I)− I (1− s) (1− μ) + s2μI (1− α) (1− p)− c
• if both banks offer a collateralized contract: ΠL = 0
Thus, the best response of bank 2 is
• to offer a screening contract if bank 1 offers a collateralized contract as ΠSL > ΠL.
• to offer a screening contract if bank 1 offers a screening contract as ΠS > ΠLS.
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For bank 1 it is optimal to offer a screening contract as ΠS > ΠL = 0. In equilibrium,
both banks offer a screening contract.
(2) Suppose α1 ≤ α < μs
2I(1−p)−μ(pX−I)(1−s)2−I(1−s)(1−2μ+μp)−c
(1−p)(1−s+s2)Iμ :
The payoffs for bank 2 are the same as in case (1).
Thus, the best response of bank 2 is
• to offer a collateralized contract if bank 1 offers a screening contract as ΠLS > ΠS.
• to offer a screening contract if bank 1 offers a collateralized contract as ΠSL > ΠL = 0.
Bank 1 prefers offering a screening contract provided that ΠSL −ΠLS > 0.
This is the case if α < μs2I(1−p)−μ(pX−I)(1−s)
2−I(1−s)(1−2μ+μp)−c
(1−p)(1−s+s2)Iμ .
For bank 1 it is optimal to offer a screening contract as ΠSL > ΠLS. In equilibrium, bank
1 screens and bank 2 collateralizes.
(3) Suppose μs
2I(1−p)−μ(pX−I)(1−s)2−I(1−s)(1−2μ+μp)−c
(1−p)(1−s+s2)Iμ ≤ α < α2:
The payoffs for bank 2 and its best response are the same as in case (2).
For bank 1 it is optimal to offer a collateralized contract as ΠLS > ΠSL. In equilibrium,
bank 1 collateralizes and bank 2 screens.
(4) Suppose α ≥ α2:
The payoffs for bank 2 are
• if both banks offer a screening contract:
ΠS = μ (1− s) (s (pX − I))− (1− μ) s ((1− s) I)− c
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• if bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a collateralized contract:
ΠLS = μ (1− s)μ (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α))
• if bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening contract: ΠSL = 0
• if both banks offer a collateralized contract: ΠL = 0
Thus, the best response of bank 2 is
• to either offer a screening contract or a collateralized contract if bank 1 offers a col-
lateralized contract as ΠSL = ΠL = 0. We assumed that a bank offers a collateralized
contract if it is indifferent between the contracts because with collateralization the
number of bad loans is minimized.
• to offer a collateralized contract if bank 1 offers a screening contract as ΠLS > ΠS.
Thus, offering a collateralized contract is the dominant strategy for bank 2.
Bank 1 is indifferent between screening and collateralizing as ΠSL = ΠL = 0 and, due to
our assumption, offers a collateralized credit contract. In equilibrium, both banks collater-
alize. Q.E.D.
5.6. Proof of Proposition 3
(1) We show that α1 < αKM :
αKM − α1 =
μI(1−sp)−(1−s)I−c
μsI(1−p) −
μ(2s−1)(pX−I)+Iμ(1−p)(1−s)−s2(μpX−I)−sI(1−μ)−c
Iμ(1−p)(1−s) =
μI−3μIs−I+2Is−c+2cs−2s2μpX+2μIs2+μspX+s3μpX−s3I
μsI(1−p)(1−s)
as μI − 2μIs− I + 2Is− c+ 2cs− 2s2μpX + 2μIs2 + μspX − μIs+ s3μpX − s3I =
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(1− s) (μs (1− s) (pX − I) + I (1− μ) (s+ s2 − 1)) + c (2s− 1) > 0
We know that (s+ s2 − 1) > 0 if s > 0. 61803 and the difference must be positive as all
terms are positive. By inserting the lowest value of the screening quality, s = 0.5, which
yields a difference of 0.125 (μpX − I) > 0, we show that the difference will always be positive.
(2) We show that αKM < α2:
α2 − αKM =
μs(1−s)(pX−I)+μs2I(1−p)−I(1−μ)(1−s)−c
μs2I(1−p) −
μI(1−sp)−(1−s)I−c
μsI(1−p) =
(1− s) μspX−2μIs+Is+μI−I−cμs2I(1−p)
as μspX − μIs− μIs+ Is+ μI − I − c = sμ (pX − I)− (1− μ) (1− s) I − c = ΠSM > 0
By comparing the threshold values derived in the previous propositions cases (i) to (iv)
can be discriminated. Q.E.D.
5.7. Proof of Proposition 4
The social planner compares social welfare for the different values of α.
For low values of α, the monopolistic bank offers a screening contract with the option
to collateralize. The competing banks both offer a screening contract. Comparing resulting
social welfare functions yields:
SWM − SW
= (μ (pX − I)− (1− μ) (1− s) I − (1− s)μ (1− p) (1− α) I − c)
−

s (2− s)μ (pX − I)−

1− s2

(1− μ) I − 2c

which is negative if α ≤ (1−s)(−(1−s)μ(pX−I)+I((μ(1−p)−(1−μ)s)))−cμ(1−p)(1−s)I . For liquidation values
below this threshold, the social planner prefers competing banks that both offer screening
contracts. Above this threshold value, the social planner prefers a monopolistic bank.
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Next, the social planner compares social welfare generated by a monopolistic bank, offer-
ing a screening contract with the option to collateralize, and competing banks when one of
them offers a screening contract and the other one a collateralized contract. This compari-
son is valid for the parameter range (1−s)(−(1−s)μ(pX−I)+I((μ(1−p)−(1−μ)s)))−cμ(1−p)(1−s)I < α ≤ αKM . Since
SW < SWM = (μ (pX − I)− (1− μ) (1− s) I − (1− s)μ (1− p) (1− α) I − c), it is obvi-
ous that the social planner prefers a monopolistic bank. For liquidation values αKM < α ≤ α2,
the monopolistic bank offers a screening contract with the option to collateralize, the compet-
ing banks offer a screening and a collateralized contract. Since a monopolistic bank decides
to switch from a collateralized contract with the option to screen to a collateralized contract,
the latter contract yields the highest social welfare. Therefore, social welfare is maximized
by a monopolistic bank.
Finally, the social planner compares social welfare if a collateralized contract is offered.
In this case SW = μ (pX − I − I (1− p) (1− α)), independently of the number of banks.
Therefore, the social planner is indifferent between a monopolistic bank and competing
banks. A collateralized contract is offered independently of the number of banks if α > α2.
Q.E.D.
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